We provide a condition for rationalizability by risk-averse expected utility preference in a demand-based framework with multiple commodities, which is a UNCAF statement in the sense of Chambers et al. (2014) . Our test can be viewed as a natural counterpart of a classical test of expected utility, due to Fishburn (1975) , in a demand setting.
Introduction
The recent contribution of Kubler et al. (2014) provides a GARP-like test for expected utility maximization in a contingent-consumption environment. In an environment with a single consumption good and finite states of the world, they establish an acyclicity condition on observed data which is both necessary and sufficient for a finite list of observed price and consumption pairs to be consistent with the hypothesis of expected utility maximization. Thus, their paper provides a counterpart of the classical work of Afriat (1967) with the added restriction that rationalizations be expected utility.
As Kubler et al. (2014) note, their test is universal in nature, removing all existential quantification. Their test amounts to verifying that the product of certain cycles of risk-neutral prices be bounded above by one. Our aim in this note is to provide a different universal test. Our test should be distinguished from the Kubler et al. (2014) test in three ways. First, it applies to any finite number of consumption goods, whereas the test of Kubler et al. (2014) only applies for a single consumption good. Secondly, our test is intimately tied to the classical von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms of expected utility theory, and thus has a simple economic intuition. On the other hand, our test involves universal quantification over a potentially infinite number of objects, while the test in Kubler et al. (2014) can be reduced to universal quantification over a finite set.
Our test is perhaps most closely related to an early revealed preference test of expected utility due to Fishburn (1975) . Fishburn constructs a test for an abstract environment of choice over lotteries with finite support. In his setting, one observes a finite set of binary comparisons; some are weak, and some are strict. Fishburn provides necessary and sufficient conditions for there to exist an expected utility ranking which extends the observed binary comparisons. Imagine that we observe lottery l k weakly preferred to lottery l k for k = 1, . . . , g, and l k strictly preferred to l k for k = g +1, . . . , K. Fishburn establishes that these observations are consistent with expected utility maximization if there is no probability distribution over {1, . . . , K} which puts positive probability on {g + 1, . . . , K}, and for which the mixture of the l k 's under this probability distribution is equal to the mixture of the l k 's. Fishburn's test can be viewed as claiming that the smallest possible extension of the observed relations satisfying both independence and transitivity leads to no contradiction.
In our case, we have n commodities, and a finite set of states Ω = {ω|1, 2 . . . , S}. We observe a finite list of prices and contingent consumption bundles chosen at those prices (
Probabilities over Ω are known and are given by the full support distribution π.
We first ask: What could reveal a violation of the joint hypothesis of expected utility and risk aversion in this context? There are only a finite set of states of the world, with known probabilities, but if the choices were rationalizable by an expected utility preference, there would be a natural extension to a preference over the set of all simple lotteries. One such violation would look like the following: suppose that for each x k , there is some y k which is feasible at prices p k . In other words, the induced lottery l x k is revealed preferred to the induced lottery l y k . And suppose that there is some g for which y g is strictly cheaper than x g at prices p g . In other words, the induced lottery l x g is revealed strictly preferred to the induced lottery l y g . Now, suppose we can find, for each k, a lottery l k which is a mean-preserving spread of l y k . If the data were rationalizable by a risk-averse expected utility preference, the lottery l x k would be preferred to l k for all k (and l x g would be strictly preferred to l g ).
We now have a set of K pairs of lotteries (l x k , l k ) which could be obtained in the preceding fashion. These data can be tested with Fishburn's condition. If, in fact, they violate Fishburn's condition, then we know that the original data cannot be expected utility rationalizable.
So far this is very simple. However, in the demand setting, for each observation (p k , x k ), there are usually infinitely many candidates for the above y k , and for each y k , an infinite number of possible mean-preserving spreads l k . This would result in an infinite number of possible {(l x k , l k )} K k=1 sets. While the Fishburn condition is sufficient to ensure each {(l x k , l k )} K k=1 set has its own preference extension, it has nothing to say about whether or not there is a single preference extension for the infinitely many revealed preference relations.
In fact, what we show is the following: If the data are not risk-averse expected utility rationalizable, then there exists at least one set, {(l x k , l k )} K k=1 , as above, that violates Fishburn's condition. In fact, they can be chosen to violate Fishburn's condition in a very stark way: one must only test the uniform lottery over {1, . . . , K}.
Moreover, the support of each l k can be chosen to consist only of consumption that was actually observed demanded at some state; i.e. the support can be chosen amongst elements of the form x k ω . This resonates with the idea from Polisson and Quah (2013) , who observe that in order to rationalize data, it is both necessary and sufficient to maintain consistency on the set of minimally extended "imaginary" data, constructed from those actually observed. However, while Polisson and Quah (2013) is concerned with developing Afriat-style algorithms (see Afriat (1967) ) for testing decision models with money lotteries, our focus is developing universal statements about data from lotteries of general consumption bundles, which provides direct falsification of the expected utility model under risk aversion.
Importantly, we can write our conditions in a way which can be interpreted as a universal (even UNCAF) axiom; thus the condition can be explained as characterizing exactly which types of data are ruled out by the hypothesis of expected utility maximization (see Chambers et al. (2014) ).
The idea of the proof is remarkably simple, and is a simple restatement of the dual set of linear inequalities stemming from the Afriat-style inequalities of Green and Srivastava (1986) or Varian (1983) .
A host of other interesting papers have recently studied choice data in the context of expected utility maximization. In particular, Echenique and Saito (2013) investigates the subjective expected utility version of the model, which forms a kind of analogue of the Kubler et al. (2014) test. It would be interesting to propose a test of our structure in the subjective expected utility framework. Epstein (2000) investigates the empirical content of the notion of probabilistic sophistication (due to Machina and Schmeidler (1992) ), providing a test which can refute the hypothesis.
The Model
We assume that there is a finite state space Ω = {ω|1, 2, . . . , S} and a finite collection of consumption goods, labeled 1, 2, . . . , N . The agent is given an objective probability distribution over states π ∈ ∆(Ω), where for all ω ∈ Ω, P r(ω) = π ω > 0. An observation is a pair (p, x), where p ∈ R SN ++ is a list of the prices of all N consumption goods under all S possible states, and x ∈ R SN + details the purchased amount of each consumption good under each state of the world 1 . We assume that our data set D
In particular,
. . .
where for all ω, k, n, x We say that D is risk-averse expected utility rationalizable if there exists a concave and nondecreasing u :
Given a data set D, we collect all the state-specific consumption bundles x k ω observed in the data:
Denote the set of all simple lotteries on R N + with finite support by ∆ s (R N + ). Denote the set of all lotteries on X by ∆(X ).
which places probability π ω on x k ω . As such, a pair of revealed preference relations C and C can be defined on ∆(X ):
to represented a revealed weak preference and C a revealed strict preference.
Moreover, to test the hypothesis of risk aversion, it is natural to extend the above revealed preference relations to ∆ s (R N + ). For example, suppose that l x C l y , and l ∈ ∆ s (R N + ) can be obtained by a sequence of mean-preserving spreads of l y .
2 If our decision maker's behavior is consistent with risk-averse expected utility maximization, it follows that l x should also be preferred to l. These ideas motivate the following definitions. 
If the agent's behavior is consistent with risk-averse expected utility maximization, the pair of relations R , R will necessarily satisfy Fishburn's condition on
As we show in our main result, it turns out that a sufficient condition for the data D to conform with risk aversion and expected utility maximization is that the restriction of R , R to ∆(X ) satisfies Fishburn's condition.
}, the following are equivalent:
2 That is, if there exists a random variable such that l
here means "has the same distribution as". See Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) for more details.
II Suppose there exist, for each k ∈ {1, . . . , K} and ω ∈ Ω, a function S
IV Data set D is risk-averse expected utility rationalizable.
Before proceeding, we comment on cases I and II, which are our contribution. Case I considers the smallest possible preference extension "consistent" with the data, risk-aversion, and the expected utility hypothesis. It claims that if this extension is meaningfully defined; in that we cannot derive that a lottery l is strictly preferred to itself, then the data are expected utility rationalizable. Importantly, we only need to consider lotteries whose support are actual observed consumption bundles. This can be seen as a natural analogue of Fishburn's condition as applied to l x k and l k .
Case II demonstrates a dual system of linear inequalities to the inequalities of case III, which was derived previously by Green and Srivastava (1986) . The interpretation of the function S k ω is as a "spread" operator. For each k, by demand behavior, the lottery l y k induced by the contingent consumption bundle
revealed weakly worse than the lottery l x k induced by x k . Since g,τ S k ω (g, τ ) = π ω , the lottery l k which places probability S k ω (g, τ ) on x g τ is a mean-preserving spread of l y k , so if the data are consistent with the hypothesis of risk-averse expected utility maximization, l k should be worse than us to find a violation of Fishburn's condition with the lotteries l x k and l k across all k if there is some l x k which is revealed strictly preferred to l k .
The following example illustrates the theorem.
Example 1. Consider the case k ∈ {1, 2}, Ω = {1, 2} and N = 2: There are 2 observations, each consisting of the price and purchased quantity for the consumptions good under 2 possible states of the world. Suppose each of the two states are equally likely; π 1 = π 2 = .5. Suppose we observe:
In this case there is no violation of GARP. However, since the hypothesis of risk-averse EU preference is stronger than than GARP, we show that this case still violates our conditions.
Violation of Statement I: The induced lotteries by x 1 and x 2 are l x 1 = ((10, 5), 1/2; (0, 0), 1/2) and l x 2 = ((4, 2), 1/2; (6, 3), 1/2), respectively. To see that this is a violation of statement I, consider contingent consumption bundles y 1 = y 2 = ((5, 2.5); (5, 2.5)) which induce l y 1 = l y 2 = ((5, 2.5), 1).
Observe that the lottery l 1 = ((4, 2), 1/2; (6, 3), 1/2) is a mean-preserving spread of l y 1 and the lottery l 2 = ((10, 5), 1/2; (0, 0), 1/2) is a mean-preserving spread of l y 2 . By definition l x 1 R l 1 and l x 2 R l 2 . However,
This constitutes a violation of Statement I.
Violation of Statement II:
Set S A couple of observations are in order. It can be shown that both (I) and (II) of our properties imply GARP. Suppose by means of contradiction that GARP is violated, i.e. that there are contingent consumption bundles z k 1 , . . . , z km such that
, where without loss we may assume there is no repetition in the cycle. This implies
To see that (I) implies GARP, observe that since
as in property (I), then a uniform distribution µ over the indices i = 1, 2, ...m constitutes a violation of (I).
For (II), consider the following set of S k ω (g, τ )'s in property II: For k = k i for some i (that is, if k shows up in the cycle)
and τ = ω 0 otherwise and for k = k i for any i (k not in the cycle)
Then the cycle condition gives a violation of property (II), a contradiction. Finally, we wish to emphasize that the result is by no means a trivial consequence of Fishburn (1975) . In his paper, he also considers the issue of testing the consistency of revealed preference relations with functional restrictions on the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility index (as we wish to test for concavity and monotonicity). Specifically, he wants to test when observed data are consistent with the utility index u belonging to some convex cone U. Again, he assumes a finite number of relations (which does not hold in our context). A natural guess is that if l k is revealed weakly preferred to l k for k = 1, . . . , g and revealed strictly preferred to l k for k = g + 1, . . . , K, then if there is µ ∈ ∆(K) for which µ({g + 1, . . . , K}) > 0 and u·( k µ k l k ) ≥ u·( k µ k l k ) for all u ∈ U, then the observed data are inconsistent with expected utility maximization with utility index u ∈ U 4 . In our case, for example, we would consider the cone of nondecreasing and concave functions; the claim would then be that k µ k l k second order stochastically dominates k µ k l k . Of course, the existence of such a µ refutes the hypothesis of expected utility rationalization with u ∈ U, but for technical reasons, the converse statement need not hold in general (it would hold, for example, if the cone U were polyhedral, which is not the case here). However, we are able to show that owing to the special structure of linear pricing, a converse statement along the lines of this idea does in fact hold in the demand-based environment. In fact, it holds even though observed revealed preference relations are infinite. That is, in general, the corresponding result in the framework of Fishburn does not hold in his abstract framework.
Proof. (III ⇔ IV)
The equivalence of III and IV is due to Green and Srivastava (1986) .
(II ⇔ III)
We proceed to show that II and III are equivalent. To this end, observe that III does not hold if and only if there is no solution to the following linear system. 5 Ab ≥ 0 and λ 0, where
and A is equal to the top two quadrants of the matrix below:
By construction of T and a standard theorem of the alternative (see for example Mangasarian (1994) p. 30), the nonexistence of b, λ such that Ab ≥ 0 and λ 0, is equivalent to the existence of η ≥ 0 such that T η ≤ 0, where 1,1,1 . . .
This is equivalent to
with strict inequality for at least one k, and
We claim that a solution to systems (1) and (2), implies the existence of γ k,ω,g,τ ≥ 0 so that
effectively showing (3) and (4) are equivalent to (1) and (2). To see this, list the η k,ω,g,τ 's from systems (1) and (2) as in Figure 1 (Notice that system (2) ensures that columns and rows passing through the same diagonal element, like the column and row in red and blue boxes, sum up to the same number.) We now construct a new matrix, say, Λ, with generic element λ k,ω,g,τ by raising all diagonal
entries of the η matrix, leaving all remaining entries the same, so that there is some M > 0 for which (g,τ ) 
and since the diagonal element shows up both in the column and and row, the resulting η matrix satisfies (3) (with λ's in place of η's), and the first equality in system (4). Finally, the γ terms are constructed by dividing each element of the matrix Λ by M .
Rearranging inequalities (3) gives
with at least one strict inequality. The second equality follows from (4). This together with (4) establishes the equivalence of II and III, by taking S
6 One simple way of doing this is to pick M large enough so that min ω π ω M > max ω (g,τ ) =(k,ω) η k,ω,g,τ .
(IV ⇒ I) That IV implies I is straightforward. Let u : R N + → R be any concave nondecreasing utility function. For lottery l, let u · l denote the expected utility of l, x∈l l(x)u(x).
Suppose that D is risk-averse expected utility rationalizable by u, and suppose by means of contradiction that statement I is not true
Since expected utility is linear in lottery mixtures, we have that
We now show that I implies II. Suppose by means of contradiction that there is a solution to the system listed in II. We will show that this implies I is false. Let
Next, observe that l y k places probability π ω at g τ S k ω (g,τ ) πω x g τ for each ω. Let l k be the lottery that puts probability ω S k ω (g, τ ) on x g τ . Since g,τ S k ω (g, τ ) = π ω , l k can be obtained from l y k by spreading, for each ω, the probability π ω placed on
τ is a weighted average of the x g τ 's by weights S k ω (g, τ )'s. So for each ω the spread described above is a mean-preserving spread in the sense of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) , and l k can be obtained from l y k by a finite number of mean-preserving spread.
By definition of R , we have obtained lotteries
with R for at least one k. In order to contradict I, it only remains now to find
As it turns out, it suffices to take µ k = 1 K for each k:
The lottery K k=1 1 K l k places probability
on each x g τ , (g, τ ) ∈ {1, · · · , K} × Ω, while the lottery
This constitutes a contradiction to I (in particular, the contradiction comes in the form of a uniform distribution over the observations 1, . . . , K).
Conclusion
We have developed a UNCAF test for the risk-averse expected utility environment with many commodities. Of interest for future research would be an analogous test in the subjective expected utility context, following the work of Echenique and Saito (2013) . The difficulty inherent in this approach rests in the fact that the inequalities in III of Theorem 1 are polynomial, rather than linear. While we have some conjectures on what might be an appropriate test, these are very speculative.
A final remark is in order. Observe that when |Ω| = 1 (and hence π ω = 1 for ω for which Ω = {ω}), we are back to the environment of Afriat (1967) . In such an environment, the function S referenced in Theorem 1, condition II can be taken to be a function of {1, . . . , K} alone. And condition II in this case tells us that k S k (l) = k S l (k) = 1 for each l; in other words, viewing S as a matrix, the matrix is bistochastic. Now, one of the contributions of Afriat (1967) is that condition II is necessary and sufficient for concave rationalization when the matrix S is restricted to be a permutation matrix; that is, a matrix consisting solely of zeroes and ones. Of course, it is well-known that the permutation matrices are the extreme points of the set of bistochastic matrices (this is the celebrated theorem of Birkhoff (1946) and von Neumann (1953) ). We conjecture that a similar statement may hold here; that it is enough to check the extreme points of the set of S functions satisfying condition II of Theorem 1. If this turns out to be true, it would give a finite list of inequalities whose satisfaction would be equivalent to risk-averse expected utility rationalizability (as of now, condition II consists of an infinite set of inequalities).
